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Key points 
Despite a continuing electricity crisis from its 
coal-fired sources, in recent years South Africa 
has become one of the leading destinations for 
renewable energy investment. This is thanks to 
the launch of its renewable energy independent 
power producers’ programme for which an 
estimated $14 billion/R168 billion has been 
committed thus far and approximately 4 GW of 
utility-scale renewable energy capacity 
approved. The programme is unique in that it in 
order for projects to qualify, developers must 
commit to undertake requirements for 
community ownership and economic 
development benefits in a country with gross 
socio-economic inequality. As the industry 
facilitated by RE IPPPP continues to develop, 
however, concerns have arisen including: the 
extent to which financial returns will leave or 
benefit the country; that the ownership of the 
industry is rapidly becoming the domain of large 
international utilities; and emerging tensions 
between ‘bankability’ required by banks and 
investors and the economic benefits and 
community ownership criteria. 
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1. Introduction 
South Africa is facing its worst electricity supply side crisis in 40 years. Regular load shedding 
has been taking place since mid-2014 and is now predicted to last until 2018. The construction 
of two coal-fired power plants, Medupi and Kusile, of approximately 4 800 MW each is 
severely behind schedule and subject to significant cost overruns (de Vos 2014). The monopoly 
utility Eskom, which to date has generated 90 per cent of the country’s coal-fired electricity, is 
strapped for cash and ridden by crisis and has been struggling since 2005 to build an additional 
17000 MW of generation capacity by 2018. By January 2015, one third of Eskom’s installed 
capacity, approximately 15 000 MW, was down and the country’s reserve margin on a knife 
edge. In addition to a commitment of R23 billion from National Treasury, the utility is now 
considering selling off its assets in an attempt to raise capital to fill an estimated funding gap of 
R200 billion ($17 billion) by 2018 (Reuters 2015). Electricity tariffs have tripled in real terms 
since 2005 and will increase by a further 12.8 per cent from April 2015 (Creamer 2015). Eskom 
has been relying heavily on expensive diesel peaking plants to make up the shortfall but has 
long exhausted its budget for this financial year.  
National debates continue to rage over which options to solve the crisis are the quickest to 
construct, the most affordable and the most technically feasible. There are also pressures to meet 
national commitments to climate change mitigation pledged in 2009. In February 2015 
President Zuma promised to do ‘everything we can’, including developing a 9 600 MW nuclear 
fleet; constructing yet more coal-fired power plants; importing hydro from the Democratic 
Republic of Congo; importing gas from neighbouring countries; developing the country’s shale 
gas reserves; and undertaking demand-side management measures such as solar hot water 
heaters and rooftop solar PV. Decision-making over the ideal electricity mix reflects deeper 
struggles over what gets supported by the state, who gets to build it, and who gets to benefit.  
In the last three years, however, carbon-intensive, coal-dependent South Africa has become one 
of the leading destinations for renewable energy investment. Investment has gone from a few 
hundred million dollars in 2011 to $5.7 billion in 2012, of which approximately $1.5 billion was 
for wind and $4.2 billion for solar, and $4.8 billion in 2013, of which $1.9 billion was for wind 
and $3 billion for solar  (UNEP/BNEF 2014:27). This investment can largely be attributed to the 
unprecedented take off of the country’s Renewable Energy Independent Power Producers’ 
Programme (RE IPPPP), launched in August 2011. Since then a privately-generated, utility-
scale, renewable energy sector is being integrated into an electricity network that has 
historically been dependent on the country’s abundant coal resources and dominated by Eskom. 
The programme has now completed three bidding rounds and a separate round for concentrated 
solar power (CSP) only (round 3.5): 66 projects have been approved, 47 power purchase 
agreements totalling 2450 MW have been signed, and 32 projects totalling 1500 MW had been 
connected to the grid by February 2015.  
RE IPPPP is the first renewable electricity initiative to have gained traction at the national level 
in South Africa. Despite a significant delay in the introduction of this programme since its 
inception in 2007 as a feed-in tariff,1 it has been hailed as an unprecedented success (Dodd 
2014). The Renewable energy country attractiveness index of EY (previously Ernest and 
Young) rated South Africa the 15th most attractive destination for renewable energy investment 
(EY 2015). Yet concerns have since arisen over various matters, including the extent to which 
the financial returns will benefit or leave the country; the fact that the ownership of the industry 
is rapidly becoming the domain of large international utilities; the nature of the programme’s 
economic and community benefits in a country with gross socio-economic inequality along 
racial divisions; and whether it will create a long-term local manufacturing and service industry. 
Despite the positive gains made by the programme to date, some industry players have 
suggested that in no more than three years since its launch in 2011, the country’s burgeoning 
                                                    
1  This follows a much longer legacy of stalled attempts to introduce privately generated energy, renewable and otherwise since 
late 1990s. See for example Bekker et al (2008), Gaunt (2008),and Eberhard and Pickering (2012). 
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renewable energy industry has now peaked and, with dramatic price decreases by the third 
bidding round, on a ‘race to the bottom’. More recently a five month delay to the financial close 
of round 3, the postponement of the selection of the winning projects of round 4, scheduled for 
November 2014 but still stalled by March 2015, now pose a threat to the sustainability of the 
programme. These delays are partly attributed to grid connection issues, the costs of which are a 
growing concern (Willis 2014). Eskom has stated that it requires additional capital of R149 
billion to 2022 in order to strengthen its transmission network and upgrade substations so that 
all projects may connect (Roelf 2015).  
The way in which RE IPPPP continues to evolve has significant implications for the country’s 
energy and infrastructure development, including privately generated power from other sources 
such as coal, co-generation and gas, and potentially that of the Southern Africa Power Pool in 
which South Africa is the major player. What then are the challenges and trends that are 
emerging from RE IPPPP? Who stands to gain and lose from this programme and how might 
the industry develop in the medium-to-long term? What will the economic and social impacts of 
RE IPPPP be in light of South Africa’s high levels of inequality and unemployment? – an 
inequality reflected in the fact that 12.3 million people or approximately 25 per cent of the 
population lack access to electricity (IEA 2011) in a country where 40 per cent of the electricity 
is consumed by the country’s energy-intensive industrial users. As previously raised by Tait et 
al (2013), to what extent will RE IPPPP empower communities and bring about meaningful 
economic development and employment for the historically marginalised, and a service industry 
that will benefit local and national small and medium enterprises? With such questions in mind, 
RE IPPPP can arguably be seen as a litmus test for whether or not renewable energy can buck 
the trend of some of the previous failures of other sectors of the country’s industrial 
development (Ashman and Fine 2012).  
This paper evaluates the key features of RE IPPPP and builds on previous studies of its 
negotiation and implementation (Eberhard et al 2014; Pegels 2012; Baker 2011). We unpack the 
different levels of the programme and the diversity of players involved in it. In doing so, we 
contribute to the literature on mechanisms for renewable technology diffusion, debates over 
‘favourable’ policy in emerging markets (Friebe et al 2014; Dinica 2006) and the global 
development of wind and solar PV industries (Lema et al 2012). We further highlight key 
tensions inherent in RE IPPPP between commercial priorities for ‘bankability’ under the norms 
and demands of project finance, and the requirements for economic development and 
community ownership, to which definitions and perceptions of risk are central. 
2. Methodology 
This paper is based on in-depth and continuing research carried out by the authors since 2010 on 
the political economy of energy, energy access and energy poverty in South Africa. The 
research has included project site visits, attendance at conferences of industry and energy 
finance, and over 80 semi-structured qualitative interviews with, amongst others, members of 
government departments, Eskom, project developers, energy intensive users, banks, lawyers, 
union members, civil society and community liaison officers. Interviewees cited in this paper 
have been anonymised because of the politically and commercially sensitive nature of the 
subject matter. Directly cited in this paper are: three members of the wind industry; two 
technical advisors to the renewable energy industry; five renewable energy project developers; 
two lawyers; two bank employees; an engineer working for the renewable energy sector; and 
representatives of the International Finance Corporation (IFC), South Africa’s Industrial 
Development Corporation (IDC), a bi-lateral donor agency, and a South African government 
department. 
Some information presented here has been collated as a result of collaboration by one of the 
authors with the Independent Power Producer’s (IPP) unit located in the Department of Energy 
(DoE). With government permission, this has enabled the subsequent analysis of confidential 
procurement data. The research has also included content analysis of sources such as policy and 
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legal documents, minutes of public meetings, media articles, speeches by government and other 
energy stakeholders and parliamentary transcripts.  
3. Background to RE IPPPP 
RE IPPPP was initially conceived in the form of the renewable energy feed-in tariff (REFIT) in 
2007 driven by individuals within the National Energy Regulator (NERSA), supported by 
bilateral donors and representatives from Treasury, the Department of Public Enterprises and 
the Department of Environmental Affairs. This drive took place despite opposition from within 
NERSA itself, the DoE and Eskom towards renewable energy. The negotiation of what is now 
RE IPPPP was part of a protracted and contested process involving different government 
departments, NERSA, Eskom, banks and investors, developers and civil society. This took place 
in a context of intense impatience from renewable energy IPPs waiting to construct and connect 
their projects to the electric grid (Baker et al 2014). Throughout its negotiation the process was 
subjected to numerous delays due to disagreements over issues including: tariff levels; who the 
buyer of power would be; mistrust of renewable energy from various factions; and perceived 
political and financial risks. The proposed REFIT, based on a tariff system was unexpectedly 
replaced by a competitive bidding system in the form of RE IPPPP when in August 2011, 
National Treasury declared REFIT illegal following an assessment carried out by Johannesburg 
law firm Webber Wentzel on the basis that ‘the predetermined tariff would fall foul of South 
Africa’s procurement rules’ (Creamer 2011:23 Aug). RE IPPPP was subsequently launched by 
the DoE with considerable backing from National Treasury, in turn supported by various 
international technical advisors. 
Whereas a feed-in tariff sets a fixed price for the purchase of renewable energy, paying 
generators a higher rate than that of the retail price for each unit of electricity fed into the grid, 
RE IPPPP, as a tender system, is based on competitive bidding. This means that potential 
project developers are invited to bid for a renewable energy contract below a certain cap. In 
South Africa’s case, scoring of bids is allocated 70 per cent on price below a certain cap which 
decreases with each round (see Table 1), and 30 per cent on economic development criteria 
which includes factors such as job creation, participation of historically disadvantaged 
individuals, protection of local content, rural development, community ownership and skills 
development. The price submission will only be considered once the economic development 
criteria have been met with the bid that meets the requirements at the lowest price winning the 
contract. RE IPPPP projects are assessed via a comparative rating system, meaning that projects 
are essentially measured against their competitors. Under RE IPPPP, successful projects will 
sell electricity to Eskom’s grid under a 20 year, local currency-denominated, government-
backed power purchase agreement (PPA). RE IPPPP is central to the South African 
government’s stated commitment to a green economy, as enshrined within key national 
documents such as the Green Economy Accord, National Development Plan and New Growth 
Path. 
Launched in August 2011, RE IPPPP had an initial allocation of 3725 MW, though an 
additional 3200MW of capacity was later declared by the Minister of Energy in December 
2012. While RE IPPPP includes allocations for a range of technologies, the majority of capacity 
allocated is for wind, solar PV and solar CSP, which form the key focus of this paper (see Table 
2). The process was launched in the same year as the country’s Integrated Resource Plan for 
electricity (IRP 2010), an electricity master plan covering total generation requirements from 
2010 to 2030. Under revision since 2013, IRP 2010 plans to double national capacity from 
approximately 41 000 MW to 89 532 MW by 2030. While coal is still set to dominate the 
generation mix, IRP (2010) includes just over 20 per cent of installed capacity (17.8GW) from 
renewable energy by 2030 that will deliver 9 per cent of supply (DoE 2011a). This will be 
generated by projects approved under RE IPPPP and other private and state-managed projects. 
A project must be in the IRP in order for NERSA to grant it a licence (Pienaar and Nakhooda 
2010) though according to the latest new generation regulations for electricity the minister holds 
the right to license generation capacity as s/he deems fit. However, the latest draft of the IRP 
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has made downwards adjustments to the demand forecast, reduced the allocation for wind and 
increased it for solar PV.  
Winners of rounds 1, 2 and 3 were announced in December 2011, May 2012 and November 
2013 respectively. All projects approved under rounds 1 and 2 have reached financial close and, 
as discussed above, many are now connected to the electric grid with a deadline of 2016 at the 
latest. Projects range in size from 20 MW to 139 MW for wind; 5 MW to 86 MW for solar PV; 
and 50 MW to 100 MW for solar CSP. Projects in rounds 1 to 3 collectively represent a 
combined foreign and domestic investment commitments of approximately $14 billion/ R168 
million (Eberhard et al 2014).2 The future of the programme beyond round four is currently 
unclear. Project bids for round 3.5, which is dedicated solely to CSP were submitted in March 
2014 and following various delays the two winning projects were announced December 2014 
(Muirhead 2014).  
Table 1: Price caps and averages RE IPPPP: Rounds 1 to 3 
Source: DoE (2013) 
Tariffs Round 1 bid 
cap (Aug 
2011) 
Round 1 
average bid  
(per kWh)  
Round 2 
average bid 
(per kWh) 
Round 3 
average bid 
(per kWh) 
Percentage 
drop Rounds 1-
3 
Wind R1.15 R 1.14 R 0.90 R 0.66 42% 
Solar PV R2.85 R 2.76 R 1.65 R 0.88 68% 
CSP  R2.85 R 2.69 R 2.51 R 1.46
3
  
Table 2: Selected preferred bidders in RE IPPPP: Rounds 1 to 3 
Source: Adapted from http://www.ipprenewables.co.za 
Techno-
logy 
MW 
awarded 
Round 1  
(Dec 
2011) 
No. of 
projects 
awarded 
Round 1 
MW 
awarded 
Round 2 
(May 
2012) 
No. of 
projects 
awarded 
Round 2 
MW 
awarded 
Round 3 
(Oct 
2013) 
No. of 
projects 
awarded 
Round 3 
MW 
awarded 
Round 3.5 
(CSP only) 
(Dec 
2014) 
No of 
projects 
awarded 
Round 
3.5 (CSP 
only) 
Total 
MWs 
awarded 
Rounds 
1-3 
Total 
projects 
awarded 
Rounds 
1-3 
MW 
capacity 
remain-
ing 
Solar PV 632 18 417 9 435 6 n.a n.a 1 484 33 1 041 
Wind 634 8 563 7 787 7 n.a n.a 1 983 22 1 336 
Solar CSP 150 2 50 1 200 2  2 400 7 100 
Landfill 
gas 
0 0 0 0 18 1 n.a n.a 18 1 7 
Biomass 0 0 0 0 16 1 n.a n.a 16 1 43 
Biogas 0 0 0 0 0 0 n.a n.a 0 0 60 
 
RE IPPPP has been applauded for its high quality regulatory framework, tough qualification 
criteria, and strong economic development and community ownership requirements. All of 
these, it is argued, provided the demanded positive policy signal to investors and developers 
(Eberhard 2013). However, many stakeholders assert that the reverse side of these requirements 
has meant that RE IPPPP has been a complex and expensive process with high compliance 
costs. As a wind industry member stated (October 2013), ‘people deliver bids consisting of 
5000 pages of original documents with seven copies. You can imagine the work that goes into 
preparing that’.  
                                                    
2  At exchange rate 1 April 2015 $1 = R11.97. 
3  Round 3 had a new tariff system for solar CSP: base prices were to be payable for 12 hours per day and 270% of the base 
price payable for five peak hours per day (Eberhard et al 2014). 
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Beyond the national developments that led to the launch of RE IPPPP, a number of parallel 
exogenous factors can be attributed to its development and the resulting new industry. These 
include the impacts of the 2008 global financial crisis on renewable energy markets in Europe 
and US which led to the reduction or removal of subsidies by governments, policy uncertainty 
and a slump in project development. Subsequently, renewable energy development and related 
investment started to shift to developing countries (Lema et al 2012), with South Africa as a key 
target (SolarServer.com 2014; UNEP/BNEF 2013:13-16). Global overcapacity in technology 
hardware has played a key role, led to fierce competition and has resulted in significant cost 
reductions, particularly in the case of solar PV. As reflected in the price drops between rounds 1 
and 3, globally speaking the levelised cost of solar PV has decreased by an average of one third 
between 2011 and 2012 (UNEP/BNEF 2013:11), while wind has experienced a 15 per cent 
decrease in cost between 2010 and 2014. Meanwhile, as renewable energy has become more 
profitable, debt financiers and equity investors with a long-term history in conventional energy 
and other infrastructure sectors are developing an emerging interest. With this in mind, the 
following sections now seek to explore the take-off of South Africa’s renewable energy industry 
since the launch of RE IPPPP within the context of the first three rounds of the programme.  
Figure 1: Map of approved RE IPPPP projects in South Africa after three bid windows 
Source: Stephen Forder, http://www.energy.org.za/ 
4. Developers, engineers and technology suppliers 
4.1 Ownership 
Some developers are really glorified estate agents… you get people who see a gap in the 
market and an opportunity to make money, whereas the engineers probably see it as a 
chance to be involved in something new in South Africa and I wouldn’t say it’s a noble 
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cause, but it’s green energy, it’s clean energy. It’s a chance for the private sector to get 
involved in selling energy. (Technical advisor interviewed October 2013) 
As the quotation above illustrates, RE IPPPP involves a diversity of stakeholders, national and 
international and interests. Most project companies are special purpose vehicles, usually a 
limited company set up by the developer for the exclusive purposes of developing, operating 
and owning the actual project. Each project company must have a minimum of 40 per cent 
South African entity participation, a minimum black ownership of 12 per cent with a target of 
20 per cent, and a minimum of 2.5 per cent ownership by communities living within a 50km 
radius of the project site. Project companies demonstrate a complexity of ownership structures 
involving the developer and other international, national, private and public players and 
technical, financial, black economic empowerment (BEE) and local community shareholders. 
While some developers involve a South African company in a joint venture with a foreign 
company, such as Cennergi, a 50/50 venture between South African coal major Exxaro and a 
subsidiary of India’s Tata Power, others consist of an international company that has set up a 
South African subsidiary, such as Norway’s Scatec Solar. Some involve a more intricate 
consortium of players with one or more majority stakeholders usually international, for instance 
the UK’s Globeleq acting with Ireland’s Mainstream Renewable Power and South Africa’s 
Thebe Investment Corporation, the Rebuna Litsatsi Trust, Enzani Technologies and Usizo 
Engineering. Others are a South African company with access to foreign capital, like Biotherm 
Energy Ltd, backed by international equity firm Denham Capital.  
The difficulty of attributing project ownership reflects the complex, transient and at times 
opaque nature of global trade and production networks, and transnational and multi-national 
flows of investment and finance (Grimes and Sun 2014). As project developer (2) explained in 
January 2014, ‘you are not going to be able to say, ‘this project is from country x or company 
y’. The South African developers who are purely South African either don’t have projects that 
are successful, or they are partnered in some form with someone who brings in international 
experience… money, technology…’. Similarly a project company may be headquartered in one 
country, have offices and operating assets in various others, and be listed somewhere else. As 
we further discuss in section 4.1, the ownership structure is also subject to change given that 
equity shares may be on-sold or restructured after three years which will make it difficult to 
keep an accurate record. With this in mind, based on publicly available information at the time 
of writing, lead developers in the wind, solar PV and CSP industry from rounds 1 to 3 have 
been compiled in Figures 2, 3 and 4.  
While round 1 favoured early entrants to the industry who had secured sites and complied with 
the necessary bid criteria such as EIAs and land tenure agreements, it also overestimated the 
number of projects that were ‘market-ready’, which meant that bid prices were close to the price 
cap, with limited competition (Eberhard 2013:2). By the second round things became more 
competitive, with ‘more of the best projects winning’ according to project developer (2) and 
prices starting to drop (see Table 1). By round 3 the process had become hugely competitive and 
while only 17 projects were selected, a total of 93 bids had been submitted.  
As Figures 2, 3 and 4 illustrate, between rounds 1 and rounds 3 ownership of the industry has 
become increasingly concentrated, with fewer companies winning more MWs, particular in the 
case of wind and solar PV. For example, the 435 MW awarded for wind in round 3 were split 
between only three developers: Italy’s Enel Green Power, Ireland’s Mainstream Renewable 
Power, and China Longyuan Power, a wholly owned subsidiary of the China State Power 
Corporation. Of these three players, Enel also leads in terms of MW awarded for solar PV 
while. Mainstream, in JV with Globeleq, is also developing projects for wind and solar PV 
under round 1. With a total of 234 MW awarded for wind, China Longyuan Power is now in 
joint second place with Cennergi in terms of total MW awarded for wind under rounds 1 to 3. 
This also marks the first time that a Chinese company has become involved as a developer in 
RE IPPPP, though Chinese companies have been involved in the supply of technology in wind 
and solar PV. In keeping with the practice of Chinese developers using Chinese technology, 
Longyuan’s parent company, Guodian United Power, China’s fourth largest state-owned utility 
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company, is providing the technology for both projects. It is understood that Chinese companies 
tend to be more tolerant of risk than their European and American counterparts, attributed in 
part to the fact that they are either state-owned or state-backed and bring with them attractive 
funding packages that others cannot meet (Lema et al 2012). A project developer surmised 
(December 2013) that ‘interest rates tend to be 40 to 50 per cent of the project cost in the long 
run, so China has a huge competitive advantage. Someone setting up a project using bank 
finance will be paying 7 or 8 per cent interest, whereas a pre-packaged Chinese project will 
come with less than one per cent interest. Over the life of a project, that’s a third of the project 
cost that is avoided.’ 
 
 
Figure 2: Approved capacity for wind by lead developer, rounds 1 to 3
4
  
                                                    
4  Figures 2, 3 and 4 reflect the author’s own compilation from publicly available sources at the time of writing. Figures do not 
reflect the all shareholders involved in the JVs or consortiums that make up the project companies. 
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
MW
Round 3
Round 2
Round 1
South Africa’s renewable energy procurement: A new frontier 8 
ENERGY RESEARCH CENTRE 
 
Figure 3: Approved capacity for solar CSP by lead developer, rounds 1 to 3  
 
 
Figure 4: Approved capacity for solar PV by lead developer, rounds 1 to 3 
4.2 Engineering, procurement and construction 
Project developers hire an engineering procurement and construction company (EPC) to be 
solely responsible for project design, procurement of equipment and construction, and the 
timely completion and commercial operation of the project. Under RE IPPPP bid requirements 
the EPC company must have a minimum black shareholding of 8 per cent with a target of 20 per 
cent, and 40 per cent South African entity participation. For this reason the EPC is usually an 
international company with a South African subsidiary, or an international company in JV or 
consortium with one or more South African entities. Consequently, South African construction 
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companies such as Murray and Roberts, Group 5 and Aveng are quite appealing to international 
companies, for their extensive experience in the construction industry (Ahlfeldt 2013:57) as 
well as their black ownership levels which remove the need ‘for complicated JVs or 
unincorporated JVs with BEE parties’, according to a lawyer interviewed in November 2013.  
As the EPC contract is generally the largest cost item in the budget at an estimated 60–75 per 
cent of total project cost (Yescombe 2013:210), it is considered a major risk, for which reason 
South Africa’s lenders have usually insisted that under rounds 1 to 3 at least the EPC provide a 
fully ‘wrapped guarantee’ or fixed-price turnkey contract around the whole project. While a 
fully wrapped EPC in turn increases project costs by about 10-20 per cent (Ahlfeldt 2013:52), it 
gives lenders ‘the confidence and guarantees that the plant will perform the way you have 
agreed prior to awarding the contract’ (bank employee; November 2013). Banks tend to insist 
on internationally experienced contractors who have carried out a minimum number of 
analogous projects elsewhere in the world. However, despite the EPC’s overall responsibility, 
much of the work will be carried out by national sub-contractors.  
The significant EPC selection criteria include the reputation, experience and expertise of the 
company, the type of technology and the supplier, and the ability of companies to demonstrate 
financial liquidity and pay a bond up-front. Thus, according to a member of the wind industry 
(October 2013) ‘the bank looks for a single counterpart who they can hold responsible for 
everything that goes wrong and who has the ability to pay damages if the plant does not 
perform’. However such an arrangement does not always run smoothly given that the foreign 
contractors in question tend not be familiar with the specifics of national requirements and so 
consider them a greater risk, which will in turn have cost implications. As a project developer 
explained (November 2013): 
the EPC contract [for wind] is often a turbine supplier from Germany or Denmark or 
somewhere else. We have asked them to come into South Africa with all of our 
complexities, labour conditions, BEE and all of that, and find construction firms to do 
civil and electrical works for them. And they are really unsure about a lot of that and what 
does that do to risk, and their view of risk and their pricing of risk. They are not best 
equipped to take the risk of local construction... So they are going to charge a whole lot 
more for it.  
The EPC construction phase is usually for a two-year term but with liabilities and equipment 
warrantees generally lasting for five years after construction. After project construction the 
operation and maintenance (O&M) contract takes over on the commercial operation date with a 
tenure length that can vary between the full term of the PPA or a five-year rolling contract. 
‘Heads of terms’ for both the EPC and O&M are submitted at the time of bidding and, while 
details will be expanded after project selection, any significant deviations will have to be 
approved in writing by the DoE. A notable development is that, while in round 1 agreements 
between the Bank, EPC contractor and developer were set out in quite basic terms, by round 3 
‘full contracts were being negotiated pre-bid, sometimes up to 90 pages’ (a technical advisor; 
October 2013). According to Ahlfeldt (2013:37), this shows that EPC contactors have had to 
reduce their profit margins, which another technical advisor states is an illustration of ‘the 
certainty that developers demand at pre-bid. They need to have pinned down their risk with their 
EPC contractors so that their price is as low as it can get.’  
The EPC, O&M and technology supply for RE IPPPP projects is dominated by international 
companies with expertise in project development for utility-scale projects (Ahfeldt 2013, see 
Figures 5 and 6). In light of the vertically integrated nature of the wind industry and its supply 
chain (Szewczuk et al 2010:23-28), in the case of wind the EPC contractor is often the same 
company as the technology supplier and in some cases the O&M. In the case of solar PV, 
however, the EPC is less often involved in technology supply given the more dispersed and 
complex nature of the supply of components involved, such as panels, inverters, transformers, 
tracking system. While there is less information in the public domain relating to CSP, Spain’s 
Abengoa and Saudi Arabia’s ACWA Power are lead players. 
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While rounds 1 to 3 have seen international companies subcontracting to national companies, 
there is an expected shift from a ‘fully wrapped’ EPC to multi-contracting (Ahlfeldt 2013:53) 
which, according to a bank employee (November 2013), ‘means that there has been a skills 
transfer in this country and that going forward many of those sub-contractors can then act as the 
sole contractor’. Multi-contracting will inevitably be more complex to manage in view of the 
interdependencies between the different contractors but it will also be cheaper as an engineer 
explained (October 2013): ‘this way you don’t have one company that marks up all the little bits 
and gives you a massive price’. 
 
  
Figure 5: EPC (lead company) by MW allocation for wind, RE IPPPP, rounds 1 to 3
5
 
 
                                                    
5  Figures 5 and 6 reflect the author’s own compilation from publicly available sources at the time of writing. The figures do not 
reflect all shareholders involved in the JVs or consortiums carrying out the EPC. 
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Figure 6: EPC (lead company) by MW allocation for solar PV, rounds 1 to 3 
4.3 Technology supply  
As previously mentioned, the 2008 financial crisis resulted in a slowdown in renewable 
development in Europe and the US, creating a manufacturing surplus from European, US and 
Chinese companies seeking markets elsewhere to absorb this. In light of this, a wind industry 
member; December 2013) argued that South Africa should seize the moment in light of such 
historically low prices: ‘We are unbelievably lucky that we are building now when everyone has 
too much lying in their factory and they beg you to take this stuff off their hands.’ 
Reflecting global trends (Walz & Delgado 2012), European companies dominate in terms of 
technology supply for wind in South Africa while China, as the world’s leading manufacturer of 
solar PV (Mazucatto 2013:144), plays a leading role in the supply of solar PV components. This 
hardware is either provided directly by state-backed or state-owned Chinese companies 
(Ahlfeldt 2013:11) or companies headquartered elsewhere but which source from China where 
the hardware is made under licence. Chinese companies supplying to RE IPPPP include 
Suntech,6 Yingli Solar, Trina Solar, Jinko solar, Build Your Own Dreams and Renesola. 
Meanwhile, the supply of inverters appears is dominated by German companies, with SMA 
Solar and Schletter as two main players.  
European companies dominate in the supply of technology for wind, as well as EPC, with 
German Nordex in the lead, followed by German Siemen’s (Figure 6). It is notable, however, 
that there is a significant minority of emerging market companies now involved, including 
                                                    
6  Once the world’s largest solar PV equipment maker; following its collapse in 2013, Suntech was bought by Chinese company, 
Shunfeng Photovoltaic International (UNEP/BNEF 2014:78). 
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India’s Suzlon and China’s Sinovel7 in round 1 and China’s Guodian United Power in round 3. 
The norms of project finance still favour contractors and technology suppliers with extensive 
experience that to date tend to be European, as an International Finance Corporation 
spokesperson (November 2013) qualified:  
Using an emerging market company may make the cost of capital higher, but it is hard to 
prove this (or find conclusive evidence)…. European and American companies are more 
established in South Africa and it may be harder for Chinese companies to operate for this 
reason. Some barriers may even be cultural. 
Concentrated Solar Power currently constitutes 600 MW of the total 3 916 MW allocated in 
windows one to three of RE IPPPP. Not only are its technology costs higher than wind and solar 
PV but its prices are two to three times higher than competing wind and solar PV technologies;  
but it is considered an ‘unproven’ technology in commercial terms. For this reason, there has 
been less ‘appetite’ from commercial banks to finance it and more involvement from national 
and international DFIs. That the technology in question be ‘proven’ is a fundamental 
consideration for the lender with regards to a project’s commercial viability (Yescombe 2013). 
Yet the flip side of this is that lending patterns can ‘lock-in’ less innovative technologies at the 
exclusion of more experimental ones that in the long term may be more effective. For instance, 
a bi-lateral donor (November 2013) explained that the demands of project finance for CSP 
excludes storage other than molten salt, which the industry does not consider particularly 
effective. 
5. Project finance demystified 
Project finance has emerged since 1980s as a mechanism for long-term, capital-intensive 
financing for privately generated energy projects, prior to which infrastructure projects were 
typically financed by public sector debt. The rise of project finance in energy has been driven by 
global trends in the unbundling of utilities, the privatisation of public sector capital investment, 
and the internationalisation of investment in large infrastructure with power generation projects 
as the most important sector (Yescombe 2013:9-11). South Africa largely evaded the trend of 
electricity liberalisation unsuccessfully imposed by structural adjustment programmes in other 
low- and middle-income countries during the 1980s and 1990s (Tellam 2003; Gratwick & 
Eberhard 2008). For this reason, project finance for renewable energy IPPs is being introduced 
into what was otherwise a monopoly-run electricity sector, with the national utility Eskom as 
the sole transmitter of electricity via the country’s high-voltage grid, responsible for 96 per cent 
of generation, and 60 per cent of distribution. In this section we investigate how project 
ownership is structured and financed and what have been the significant changes between the 
first two bidding rounds and the third. 
The norms of project finance set by the main providers of debt finance are highly deterministic 
over the nature of the project’s development and contractual arrangements like choice of 
technology, the nature of the EPC contract and the equity structure. The majority of renewable 
energy project costs occur at the beginning of the project, with the initial capital outlay 
constituting up to 90 per cent of the total cost. This is in comparison to conventional energy 
such as coal or gas which incurs greater costs further into the lifetime of the project (Nelson & 
Shrimali 2014:iv). Though fuel costs for wind, solar PV and CSP projects are non-existent, the 
high upfront capital costs must be met by the project developer and the related debt investment 
and equity finance.  
Renewable energy project financing is generally structured on the basis of a 70:30 debt to equity 
ratio of the capital cost of the project (Mendonça et al 2010:24) though in South Africa’s case 
                                                    
7  Suzlon was to have held a market larger share but lost an EPC contract to Nordex at the last minute due to 
concerns of financial solvency.  
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this is sometimes up to 80:20. Simply put, the more debt there is, the lower the average cost of 
funding, the lower the tariff and the cheaper the project. Lenders provide finance-based debt on 
fixed loan terms and therefore the minimisation of risk is their key priority (Yescome 
2013:199). While lenders are in first receipt of the financial revenues generated by the project, 
returns for equity investors or project sponsors are more dependent on the project’s successful 
generation of a return (Yescome 2013: 13). Equity investors therefore carry far greater risk for 
which they expect to generate a higher return. As explored below, renewable energy project 
finance in South Africa is uniquely characterised by RE IPPPP requirements for minimum 
levels of BEE and community ownership. Figure 7 illustrates the way in which the different 
entities involved within project finance in RE IPPPP may fit together. The three main phases of 
project finance can be summarised thus: 
i. Setting up the IPP, which involves finding an international shareholder that will bring 
finance and reputation to the project, and starting the work – e.g undertaking an 
environmental impact assessment, land tenure agreement and energy resource 
assessment; and negotiating technology supply and EPC. This is a high-risk phase for 
finance and involves venture capital and international investors.  
ii. Securing project finance which focuses on building the asset and establishing project 
finance. The debt/equity ratio is defined at which point commercial banks get involved.  
iii. Operational phase: the project is generating and is now minimal risk. In South Africa’s 
case debt can be sold at commercial operation date and equity after three years. 
 
Figure 7: Project structure, ownership and development 
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5.1 Debt 
In rounds 1 and 2, South Africa’s four main banks (Standard, Nedbank, ABSA Capital, and 
Rand Merchant) were the majority providers of debt financing, in addition to financial services 
group Investec providing a total of R57 billion (see Table 3). The balance was provided by 
development finance institutions (DFIs) and export credit agencies (R27.8 billion) and 
insurance funds (R4.7 billion) (Eberhard et al 2014:1). In the case of large projects, developers 
generally appoint two or three banks to co-finance in light of funding limits. In some cases debt 
financing is also provided by the project developer, such as by Electricité de France in the case 
of the Waainek wind farm (Innowind/EDF 2012). As discussed in section 5.4, round 3 saw a 
shift to corporate financing and a reduced role for South Africa’s banks. 
The average cost of debt for renewable energy projects financed under RE IPPPP is understood 
to be based on an average interest rate of 12 per cent per year for a 20-year term (according to 
informal discussions and interviews with project developers and industry stakeholders). This is 
significantly higher in comparison to European countries or the US, where interest rates are 
generally fixed around seven per cent per year for a 10 to 15 year term (Nelson and Shrimali 
2014:1). 
As a DFI, South Africa’s Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) has played a major role as 
a debt financier but also as an equity investor and in supporting BEE companies and community 
trusts to buy their share of equity. It has financed 22 renewable energy projects at a cost of 
R13.5-billion in rounds 1 to 3, of which R2.7-billion was for community participation (IDC 
2014). The Development Bank of South Africa (DBSA) has played a similar role. International 
DFIs, such as the World Bank’s International Finance Corporation (IFC) and International Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development, and the European Investment Bank are lenders in a small 
number of projects, usually restricted to financing ‘unproven’ technology i.e. CSP, and always 
in partnership with other lenders8. As an IFC spokesperson explained (interview, November 
2013): ‘Where commercial banks participate, IFC prices in line with the commercial lending 
market. We often have longer tenures however, and thereby take on more risk.’  
There has been minimal appetite for international banks to get involved in debt financing given 
the currency risk involved. A bank employee (November 2010) explained that, as South 
Africa’s exchange rate is floating, the rand has witnessed dramatic fluctuations in recent years, 
meaning that international banks are not likely to get involved except for syndicated debt, after 
it has been de-risked. 
Table 3: RE IPPPP main lenders 
Nedbank Capital Supporting over a third of approved allocated capacity in rounds 1 and 2 (Old 
Mutual plc 2014) comprising 875 MW. In round 3 it has underwritten debt funding 
to a total of R6.8 billion for seven projects (two solar PV, two wind and two solar 
CSP and one landfill gas), valued at R26.2-billion. Nedbank is owned by 
OMIGSA (see Table 4).  
Standard Bank Has underwritten R9.4-billion for wind and solar projects in round 1 and R6.4-
billion in round 2 (Odendaal 2014). Limited involvement in round 3. 
Rand Merchant Bank A division of First Rand Bank Limited, the second-largest listed banking group 
(by market capitalisation) on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange. RMB committed 
R8.4 billion to five projects in round 1 and R3.4 billion to four projects during 
round 2 (RMB 2013). 
Absa Corporate and 
Investment Banking 
A subsidiary of Barclays (UK), ABSA is providing R10.8-billion in debt funding to 
six projects, comprising wind, solar PV and CSP to a combined capacity of 635 
MW in round 3, which is about one-third of the total debt committed overall by 
South Africa’s commercial banks for this round (Odendaal 2014). 
                                                    
8  For instance, the World Bank’s IFC and IBRD are lending to Abengoa’s 100 MW KaXu Solar CSP trough solar plant, and the 
IFC and the EIB to Abengoa’s 50 MW Khi CSP tower project. 
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Industrial 
Development 
Corporation  
A major player in both debt finance and equity investment, South Africa’s IDC is 
involved in 17 projects in rounds 1 and 2, and at least three projects in round 3. 
Set up in 1940 for the development of national industrial capacity. Owned by the 
South African government, under the supervision of the Economic Development 
Department. 
Development Bank of 
South Africa  
A DFI wholly owned by the government of South Africa. DBSA is a major player 
in debt finance and equity investment. 
Investec 
 
A specialist bank and asset manager operating in UK, South Africa and Australia, 
Investec has provided an estimated R75 billion ($7.5 billion) [in rounds 1 and 2 
(Gecelter 2013). It differs from other private banks in that it operates as a 
provider of debt and equity as well as lead arranger (Investec 2014). For 
example it is providing debt finance and 34.5% of equity to the West Coast 1 
wind farm for which it is also lead arranger.  
Future Growth Asset 
Management’s Power 
Debt Fund 
Part of the Old Mutual Group, registered in UK (see Table 4). Future Growth’s 
Power Debt Fund is providing R4 billion in debt finance to 18 projects in rounds 1 
and 2 (www.energy.org.za/news/13-media-releases/83-south-african-based-
asset-manager-involved-in-23-local-renewable-energy-projects). 
Other DFIs Includes: IFC, EIB, IBRD 
5.2 Equity 
Equity investment is provided by a diversity of players, including various different 
combinations of: national and international infrastructure and investment funds; South Africa’s 
DFIs as discussed above; BEE investors and partners; and community trusts, themselves often 
funded by the IDC, DBSA and PIC. In many cases the majority equity shareholder is the 
international renewable energy developer, as for instance with Acciona, Abengoa, Scatec Solar, 
GDF Suez and Gestamp Solar. Other major players identified to date are included in Table 4. 
Some less than usual foreign equity shareholders include: Google (US), providing $12 million 
(R144 million)9 to the Jasper PV plant in the Northern Cape and the Japanese Sumitomo 
Corporation which holds a 60 per cent share in the Dorper wind farm. In rounds 1 and 2, 
internal rates of return  for equity ranged ‘primarily in the late teens to mid-twenties’, 
considerably higher than the returns obtained on projects built in developed countries and which 
makes South Africa’s market so attractive to investors (Ahlfeldt 2013:xiii). In round 3 however 
these rates are understood to have dropped dramatically in parallel with the drop in tariffs. Of 
the R44.4 billion provided for both debt and equity in round 3, 35 per cent (R15.6 billion) came 
from foreign investment, of which 50 per cent for equity and 25 per cent for debt (DoE 2013). 
Table 4: Equity investors, RE IPPPP: Rounds one to three 
Globeleq Formed out of the UK’s CDC group in 2002
 (
Itself wholly owned by the UK’s 
Department for International Development), and now owned solely by the 
UK’s Actis Infrastructure Fund. Globeleq is a majority shareholder in all six 
projects being developed by Mainstream Renewable Power in rounds 1 and 
3. It holds a 39 per cent stake in the 138 MW ACED Cookhouse wind farm. 
Old Mutual Investment 
Group South Africa 
(OMIGSA):  
Part of the Old Mutual Group, registered in UK. OMIGSA is a major investor 
through its IDEAS managed fund and Futuregrowth fund. It is understood to 
be the major investor in solar PV in South Africa (Jansen 2014b). OMIGSA 
also owns 52 per cent of NedBank (see Table 3).  
Old Mutual’s Futuregrowth 
Asset Management 
Involved in 23 RE IPPPP projects as both debt financier and equity 
shareholder. Its Power Debt Fund is providing R4 billion in debt finance to 
18 projects in rounds 1 and 2, while in round 3 its Development Equity Fund 
is investing a total of R165-million in five projects, of which four are wind 
(www.energy.org.za/news/13-media-releases/83-south-african-based-asset-
manager-involved-in-23-local-renewable-energy-projects).  
Old Mutual IDEAS 
Managed Fund 
Created in 1998, the fund focuses on ‘infrastructure investments that make 
a significant contribution to economic growth and/or upliftment within the 
sub-categories of core infrastructure, environmental infrastructure and social 
                                                    
9 At exchange rate 1 April 2015 $1=R11.97 
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infrastructure’ (IDEAS 2013). Shareholder in three round 3 projects to a total 
value of R455 million.  
Africa Infrastructure 
Investment Managers: 
Set up in 2000 as a JV between OMIGSA and Macquarie Capital. AIIM is 
also a shareholder in the Infrastructure Empowerment Fund Managers, a 
joint venture with Kagiso Tiso Holdings and in turn the manager of the 
Kagiso Infrastructure Empowerment Fund (see below). AIIM also 
established the Africa Infrastructure Investment Fund in 2004 which is in 
turn funded by the World Bank’s IFC (Trade Mark South Africa 2010) and a 
shareholder in the Hopefield and Cookhouse wind farms. 
Inspired Evolution 
Investment Management 
South Africa-based clean technology and energy efficiency investor through 
its Evolution One Fund. Shareholder in the RustMo 1 solar farm; an investor 
in AFPOC limited which co-owns ACED, developer of the Cookhouse Wind 
farm; owns joint shares in the SlimSun Swartland Solar Park, with Franco 
Afrique Technologies; and provided early stage risk capital for two projects 
developed by Red Cap Investment in round 1. (http://inspiredevolution.co. 
za/investments/).  
Loreko Metier Sustainable 
Capital 
A fund established by Lereko Investments and Metier with investments from 
South Africa’s PIC, the German development finance institution and the 
Dutch Development Bank (Srivastava 2012). 
Public Investment 
Corporation 
Public asset management firm, wholly owned by the South African 
government to which major contributor is Government Employees Pension 
Fund. PIC is a shareholder in two CSP projects and one solar PV. 
National Empowerment 
Fund 
Established by the National Empowerment Fund Act No 105 of 1998, NEF 
provides financial and non-financial support to black empowered 
businesses. 
IDC Particularly involved in CSP. See Table 3. 
DBSA See Table 3. 
5.3 Black economic empowerment and community 
shareholdings 
South Africa’s renewable energy industry is characterised by the unique national requirement 
for BEE. Under RE IPPPP there has to be a minimum of 40 per cent South African entity 
participation and a minimum black ownership of the project company of 12 per cent with a 
target of 20 per cent. Local communities must have a minimum 2.5 per cent shareholding, 
though in some cases this is much higher. A lawyer explained (November 2013) that, if your 
community beneficiaries are a minimum of 85 per cent black ‘by making your project company 
25 per cent community owned, it also ticks the black ownership box [and brings it to] above the 
20 per cent target level. In this way, your local community doubles up with black ownership.’ 
BEE and community shareholders often require financing either from the company in which the 
shareholding is being acquired or from a third party financier such as a bank or DFI, or from a 
combination of both.  
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Table 5: BEE shareholders, RE IPPPP: Rounds one to three 
Thebe Investment 
Corporation 
 
Shareholder in a consortium in all of Mainstream Renewable Power’s projects. 
Founded in 1992, it is one of South Africa’s most established broad based BEE 
Investment management companies (www.mirafunds.com/our-funds/private-
funds#). 
Shanduka group Holds 25% shareholding in Noblesfontein Wind Power Project in round 1. 
Founded in 2001 by prominent businessman Cyril Ramaphosa who withdrew from 
the group in 2014 
Soul City Broad 
Based Empowerment 
Company  
Shareholder in the Sishen Solar PV plant and the Gouda Wind Farm developed 
by Spain’s Acciona and South Africa’s Aveng, holding a 10 per cent stake in both. 
Jay & Jayendra  South African-based investment holding and management company providing 
financial backing for the two solar parks being developed by Solaire Directe 
Kagiso Infrastructure 
Empowerment Fund 
Managed by AIIM (see above), it was established in 2006 to promote 
‘empowerment objectives and investments in infrastructure projects’
10
. KIEF is an 
equity shareholder in the Hopefield and West Coast One wind farms.  
Kensani Group Involved in all three projects developed by Solar Reserve projects 
 
5.4 Shifting risk 
Risk, and the way in which it is perceived and defined is fundamental to the norms and demands 
of project finance. For lenders and investors, higher risks require higher returns, which 
inevitably puts up the cost of capital and thus ‘domestic institutional, regulatory and public 
policy measures are crucial in reducing investor risk’ (SARi 2010:21). The inability of different 
stakeholders to agree over how risk should be apportioned was one reason for the continued 
stalling of what was still at the time a feed-in tariff (REFIT) in particular with regards to the 
government-backed PPA on ‘acceptable terms’ (Baker 2011). The PPA proposed under REFIT 
was heavily criticised by developers and banks for allocating too much risk to renewable energy 
project developers as compared to Eskom as the buyer of power (Waller 2010:47). Banks 
insisted that the PPA be underwritten by government in light of Eskom’s financial instability as 
this would legally enforce the government’s commitment. Since the launch of RE IPPPP 
however, which eliminated many of these previous concerns, the risk profile of a renewable 
energy project is usually based on the profile of the sponsors; the experience and financial 
strength of the EPC and O&M companies; and the track record and guarantees of technology 
providers (Ahlfeldt 2013:xiii). Other risks include resource risk, determined by the reliability of 
predictive data for wind and solar (van Kooten and Timilsina 2009:12); and social and labour 
unrest (Bank 1).  
For banks, the financial model must demonstrate that the project will be able to repay the debt 
and that the developer has a good credit rating. Bank (2) stated:  
Firstly the project has to make financial sense and generate a required rate of return. Our 
main concern as lender is to have our debt repaid. Secondly we look at the personal 
merits of the client, their capacity, expertise, people skills, equity and the likelihood of 
them appealing to the ‘stakeholders’, by which we mean the government for example. 
Lastly we ask to what extent is the developer serious and credible? Not all project 
developers have proven to be so.  
In light of the very high margins involved in debt finance, many industry stakeholders felt that 
South African banks had inflated the risks involved and passed this cost onto the developer.’ 
More cynically, a wind industry member expressed (December 2013):  
There were only four banks and they were clubbing together anyway as they wouldn’t 
like to take all the risk themselves. It’s a Rand denominated contract and no one can 
                                                    
10 http:// 
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really compete with that at the moment. But they can cite you good reasons why they 
were so expensive. 
The banks justified the level of risk with the assertion that, while in Europe the sector was well-
established and well understood, in South Africa  
we have been more conservative as we are doing it for the first time…There are a number 
of round 1 projects where our initial concerns have materialised e.g the process of getting 
panels and turbines to site is a logistical challenge… Quite a few of the equipment 
suppliers are feeling the global financial crunch and have been in financial difficulties. So 
in some instances we have had to structure deals on the understanding of a relatively high 
probability of financial distress within the panel, inverter or turbine supplier e.g Suzlon, 
Suntech. (Bank employee; interview November 2013)  
Lawyers have played a fundamental role in negotiating legal agreements and the terms of risk 
between shareholders, lenders and the companies or consortiums carrying out the EPC, 
particularly in light of South Africa’s limited experience of project finance in energy.  
5.5 From project finance to corporate finance 
The nature of project finance between the RE IPPPP’s winning projects in rounds 1 and 2 and 
round 3 announced in November 2013 witnessed a dramatic and unexpected shift away from 
South Africa’s four main national banks as the majority suppliers of debt finance. While the 
majority of projects in round 1 and 2 were largely financed by local banks, six out of 17 projects 
approved in round 3 were corporate-financed. Corporate finance sees loans lent against a 
company’s balance sheet and does not therefore require debt finance from the banks. The six 
corporate financed projects were all won by Enel, a large Italian/international utility that won 
four out of six solar PV projects to a total of 285 MW out of 435 MW awarded, and two out of 
seven wind projects to a total of 197 MW out of 791 MW awarded (see Figures 3 and 4). 
Projects financed with corporate finance are not subject to the same stringent loan requirements 
imposed by South Africa’s banks providing debt finance. 
The surge of corporate financed projects in round 3 which reduced the role of national banks led 
to what a bank employee described (interview November 2013) as ‘an existential crisis’ with 
regards to their role going forwards: ‘the banks in many respects were gatekeepers in rounds 1 
and 2 and ensured that risk averse structures were put in place’. Bank (1) further surmised that, 
as a large company, Enel would be willing to take more risk and accept lower returns because of 
its track record and experience, access to capital and the likelihood that it has preferential 
pricing agreements with equipment manufacturers. There was a strong sense amongst South 
African renewable stakeholders in late 2013 that the unexpectedly low prices offered in round 3 
were unsustainable both financially and in terms of the longer-term development of a national 
industry that will have benefits for the wider economy. As a wind industry member (December 
2013) stated: 
In the third round there were projects that were not project financed, it was all equity 
deals at returns approximating government bonds in rand unhedged. So that is really 
scraping the barrel. …Is RE IPPPP going to become a programme for international 
utilities with international equipment? We pay less, but the money is leaving the 
country… From the perspective of an industry…if this trend continues people will shut 
up shop and leave. 
5.6 On-selling 
Debt can be on-sold almost immediately after commercial operations date and equity after three 
years subject to approval from the DoE and in the case of equity, the lenders. A bank employee 
explained that ‘we are bringing lenders in at financial close with us’. Some of this debt has been 
on-sold to insurance companies (Eberhard 2013:6) and local pension funds. It is expected that 
asset management companies (African Review 2015) and dedicated infrastructure investment 
firms will also get involved (Bornochis 2015). A project developer stated (December 2013) that 
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there are secondary markets developing, whereby people are starting to syndicate and sell 
down their debt… I think we will get a proper secondary market share in renewable 
energy developing in South Africa. I think we will soon start looking at listing renewable 
energy companies on the JSE. Also we will see the issuing of bonds and green bond 
markets.  
As there is a three year restriction on the sale of equity, no equity has yet been sold. Reasons for 
the sale of equity are sometimes lack of liquidity but, more generally, reflect the nature of 
project finance whereby equity investors seek to sell their shares on then seek to reinvest their 
equity in other projects. As an IDC representative explained (November 2014): 
Your private equity players will come in, de-risk it, sell it off, make their profit and then 
pension funds invest in it long term just for the cash flow. The private equity players are 
essentially selling cash flow to the pension funds. The equity shareholders make the profit 
because they took the risk and so they take the return.  
Therefore, despite the due diligence undertaken before financial close in order for the project to 
qualify to win, equity shareholdings of these projects may very quickly become assets that are 
bought, sold and repackaged in the financial markets. This may result in opaque financing 
structures which will pose a risk to projects. As one financial analyst stated (November 2014), 
‘there is a rigorous due diligence bid process where everyone is vetted but then people start 
trading their positions. This almost defeats the purpose.’ Furthermore, given that project owners 
are responsible for the implementation of the economic development criteria tied to the project, 
when the ownership structure of the project changes following the sale of equity shares, how 
these responsibilities will be upheld is of serious concern. Not least the project developer is 
likely to have over emphasised the project’s economic and community benefits in order to win 
the bid in the first instance, while after the sale of equity ‘owners … are left to actually deliver 
on promises’ (Eberhard et al 2014:29). It therefore remains to be seen how the situation will 
develop and what the impacts of the sale of equity will be in coming years.  
A final consideration is that BEE shareholders are restricted from selling their equity due to the 
complex nature in which the BEE shareholding is packaged within the economic development 
score card. As projects need a minimum BEE shareholding of 12 per cent in order to meet the 
economic development requirements of RE IPPPP, should they lose this quota this would be 
grounds for the project to lose its licence. Therefore BEE shareholders would need to sell on to 
another equity partner with the same BEE score (IDCrepresentative; November 2014). This is 
likely to mean that the BEE and community shareholdings will remain static, in addition to DFI 
shareholdings who as public finance institutions are also unlikely to sell, while the other equity 
shareholdings could change hands on a tri-yearly basis. 
6. Economic development and community ownership 
Renewable energy is an extractive industry just like any other, even though the energy 
may be ‘clean’. The issues are still the same in terms of erecting billions of Rands of 
infrastructure in a place where previously there has been nothing. However, the 
difference in South Africa is that there is an obligation for community development and 
socio-economic development. (Project developer) 
South Africa’s procurement programme is unique in that the projects in question must structure 
local communities into their equity share as well as contribute to economic development 
criteria. As discussed above, projects that bid under RE IPPPP are scored 70 per cent on tariff 
and 30 per cent on an assessment of their economic development contributions. These are 
outlined in an economic development scorecard which aligns with the country’s Broad Based 
Black Economic Empowerment legislation and contains seven criteria that project developers 
must comply with, as indicated in Table 6. Four of these criteria, enterprise development, socio-
economic development, local community ownership and job creation, stipulate actions that must 
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take place within a 50-kilometre radius of the project, referred to by the programme as ‘local 
communities’.  
Table 6: Economic development elements and weighting as outlined in the procurement document 
for the first bid window 
Source: Compiled from DoE (2011a; 2011b)  
  
Economic 
development 
elements  
Description Measurement Threshold Target Weighting 
1. Job creation 
RSA-based employees 
who are citizens 
Number of citizens 
employed number of 
RSA based employees 
50.0% 80.0% 
25% 
RSA-based employees 
who are black citizens 
Number of black citizens 
employed/ number of 
RSA-based employees 
30.0% 50.0% 
Skilled employees who 
are skilled black 
citizens 
Number of skilled black 
citizens employed/ skilled 
employees 
12.0% 20.0% 
RSA-based employees 
that are citizens from 
local communities 
Number of citizens from 
local communities 
employed / number of 
RSA-based employees 
15.0% 25.0% 
2.  
Local 
content 
Value of local content 
spend 
Value of local content 
spend / total project value 
Technology 
specific 
25% 
3. Ownership 
Shareholding by black 
people in the project 
company 
Shareholding by black 
people/ total 
shareholding 
12.0% 30.0% 
15% 
Shareholding by black 
people in the 
contractor responsible 
for construction 
8.0% 20.0% 
Shareholding by black 
people in the 
operations contractor 
8.0% 30.0% 
Shareholding by local 
communities in the 
project company 
Shareholding by local 
communities/ total 
shareholding 
2.5% 5.0% 
4. 
Management 
control 
Black top management 
Number of black people 
in top management using 
the adjusted recognition 
of gender/ number of 
people in top 
management 
  40.0% 5% 
5. 
Preferential 
procurement  
BBBEE procurement 
spend 
Amount of procurement 
spend on BBBEE 
Contributors recognised 
in terms of BBBEE 
Recognition levels / total 
amount of procurement 
spend 
  60.0% 
10% 
QSEs and EMEs 
procurement 
Amount of procurement 
spend on QSEs and 
EMEs/ total amount of 
procurement spend 
  10.0% 
Women owned 
vendors procurement 
Amount of procurement 
spend on women owned 
vendors/ total amount of 
procurement spend 
  5.0% 
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6. 
Enterprise 
development 
Enterprise 
development 
contributions 
Enterprise development 
contributions/ revenue 
  0.6% 
5% 
Adjusted enterprise 
development 
contributions 
Adjusted enterprise 
development 
contributions/ revenue 
  0.6% 
7. 
Socio-
economic 
development 
Socio-economic 
development 
contributions 
Socio-economic 
development 
contributions/ revenue 
1.0% 1.5% 
15% 
Socio-economic 
development 
contributions 
Socio-economic 
development 
contributions/ revenue 
1.0% 1.5% 
  Total    
100% / 
30 points 
 
In rounds 1 and 2 of the procurement process there were minimum thresholds and maximum 
targets for job creation, local content, ownership and socio-economic development, while the 
remaining economic development criteria had maximum targets only. By round 3, however, all 
criteria had flexible economic development targets, which means that bidding projects are 
measured against each other and the benchmark is set by the project with the highest score. This 
led to very competitive bidding by developers and resulted in a small number of projects 
structuring in up to 40 per cent community ownership within the 30 per cent equity share in 
order to maximise their score (Wlokas 2014).  
A critical challenge for project developers has been how best to design and implement responses 
to the various economic development criteria and ownership requirements, which, according to 
many interviewees, have been interpreted quite differently depending on the developer. Not 
only are the economic development requirements of RE IPPPP highly complex, ‘incorporating 
17 sets of minimum targets and thresholds’ (Eberhard 2013:2), but also go beyond the core 
competence of most developers. In the light of this challenging new task , a number of project 
developers have contracted socio-economic development consultants and/or community liaison 
officers. The requirements have posed a particular challenge to foreign developers with no or 
limited experience in South Africa. As project developer (4) explained, ‘It is a challenge to 
explain black economic empowerment, SED [socio-economic development] etc to foreign 
companies. Some companies are progressive, particularly those who have had a footprint in the 
country for some time. Others see it as a transaction cost and hope that their local counterpart 
will deal with it’. More extremely, one company representative was reported to have said: ‘don’t 
bother me with your African problems’. However, failure to deliver on economic and 
community development is a ‘potential breakage event,’ and can result in the PPA being 
terminated. 
Many interviewees talked about raised expectations amongst community members as a serious 
issue that could pose a threat to the viability of the project. Government (1) stated:  
This is a ticking time bomb if it is not managed carefully. In South Africa with our past 
… communities want electricity the same as in urban areas and if they don’t get it they 
will get very frustrated. We underestimate communities but they are lot more aware than 
we think and sometimes more aware than we are. So the biggest thing besides with the 
technical stuff that could go wrong … is with community interaction. 
In the following sections, we outline some of the early experiences of efforts to implement some 
of the RE IPPPP’s economic development and community ownership requirements.  
6.1 Enterprise development and socio-economic development 
While in most projects local communities will not receive equity dividends until the project has 
paid down its debt and started generating profit, a smaller spend of 1.5 per cent of projected 
project revenue for socio-economic development (SED) and 0.6 per cent for enterprise 
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development (ED) starts in the first year of project operation. For bid submission, project 
developers are obliged to assess socio-economic needs within a 50km radius of the project site 
and state their commitments to providing financial resources for health, education and other 
objectives during the lifespan of the project. A similar requirement is stipulated for ED for 
which project developers must identify and design programmes, such as support for small- and 
medium-sized enterprises or business skills training. While these are new challenges for the 
young renewables industry, they are common requirements for South Africa’s business 
environment along the principles of corporate social responsibility and investment, which in 
South Africa are generally interpreted through the national BEE legislation (Hamann 2006). 
However, RE IPPPP’s requirement that local communities be incorporated into the shareholding 
thereby creating an additional and potentially community managed source of money for local 
development is a new practice.  
Bidders’ commitments are also qualitatively evaluated. Bids are required to include a so-called 
‘SED plan’ which evaluates the needs of the project’s beneficiary communities and what 
measures the project will undertake to respond to them. However, different developers take 
different approaches to undertaking this plan and, while some assessments are carried out in 
participation with the local communities, others are desktop studies. A team of advisors within 
government, based in the DoE, assesses the SED plans submitted by developers and, as a team 
member explained, must assess whether or not an SED plan is ‘half baked’ and ‘put together in 
the last minute’.  
The committed investment from all 64 currently approved IPPs from all three rounds that will 
be put towards SED and ED totals over R11.5 billion over 20 years in nominal terms. The 
highest spend is found in the Western, Northern and Eastern Cape Provinces where the majority 
of projects approved under RE IPPPP are located. Project developers are obliged to quarterly 
report on the investments they make using project funds during the lifetime of the project. 
While small contributions might be invested during project construction, the committed SED 
and ED spends begins at commercial operation.  
 
 
Figure 8: Accumulated SED and ED commitment of IPPs rounds 1 to 3 over 20 years by province  
Source: Wlokas (2014) 
Tait et al (2012) identify a number of concerns including the identification of beneficiaries 
within the 50km radius, how spending should be allocated in areas with more than one project, 
and the different approaches chosen by companies when engaging with communities. As it is at 
the discretion of the developer as to which communities will benefit, not all citizens living 
within the 50 km radius will necessarily reap the positive impacts of a project. Who the 
beneficiaries will be and how they may benefit can be further complicated by very different 
levels of population density, socio-economic development and racial mix depending on the area 
and whether or not the project is in a rural, peri-urban or urban area. The unequal distribution of 
projects and funding for local economic measures across the country is also an issue, 
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particularly in cases where communities may benefit from more than one project. De Aar in the 
Northern Cape is one potential example of this where there are seven projects being developed 
within the environs of the small town with limited economic development opportunities beyond 
the recent introduction of renewable energy. Many have argued that, for this reason, RE IPPPP 
will benefit a small number of communities disproportionately, as compared to sharing the 
benefits at a provincial or even a national level (Wlokas et al 2011; Tait et al 2012). 
6.2 Bringing in the communities: local ownership  
As discussed above, a unique requirement of RE IPPPP is that project companies are obliged to 
structure local communities into the equity shareholding, which is often funded by a South 
African development finance institution such as the IDC or DBSA. Local communities must 
have a minimum 2.5 per cent shareholding in project equity, though less commonly in some 
projects they own up to 40 per cent (Wlokas 2014), particularly following competitive bidding 
by developers in round 3. This shareholding has to be allocated to a legal entity, such as a trust, 
set up to represent the local community and tasked with managing the dividends. Trust deeds 
are generally prepared by the project team and its consultants as there is no prescribed template 
from government. The trusts are governed by a board of trustees, selected according to the trust 
deeds and can include representatives from the projectcompany, financial institutions, 
professional trustees, legal professionals and representatives of the beneficiary community or 
communities.  
The number of individuals from the community on the board of trustees depends, however, on 
the project company’s appetite to hand over control to local communities. That communities are 
structured into project equity does not necessarily grant them voting rights in the project. In 
some instances, community ownership in the project is structured into a broader BEE 
shareholding with other stakeholders. Lawyer (2) explained that having the community as a 
larger shareholder was perceived both a risk and a convenience for developers:  
On the one hand people see it as an easy option because it ticks the BEE box. You have a 
giant, silent investor who won’t be too critical and will get their money in year 1711 once 
finances have been paid down. But actually there are real people out there who have very 
real needs and expectations. Unless they are managed appropriately you could find 
yourself in a very uncomfortable situation.  
Another level of complexity is added by the fact that there is no standard amount of investment 
that must be allocated for local communities. The amounts vary considerably depending on the 
size of the project, the financing terms, and the commitments made by project developers in the 
bidding process. It will also be some years into project operations before the communities 
receive any dividends. As a project developer explained (October 2013): 
In the case of … community trusts, the funding takes some time to flow. The project will 
be paying off the debt for years before the equity shareholders, and hence the 
communities will benefit financially. There are normally tenors of about 15 years before 
any significant financial benefits reach the communities, though [before that] there may 
be small ‘trickle dividends’. A community often has a 5 per cent shareholding and will 
have a long time to wait before the debt is paid off and they benefit.  
IDC funded community ownership is structured differently, allowing for trusts to receive 
income from year one onwards already. Therefore transparency and effective communication 
between companies and communities is absolutely crucial to ensure a positive relationship and 
the genuine acceptance of the project. 
                                                    
11  Year 17 is not an absolute rule. It could be sooner or later than this. 
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6.3 Job creation  
As indicated in Table 6, job creation constitutes 25 per cent of the economic development 
criteria. While developers must commit to a project-specific number of jobs to be created within 
local communities, it is generally understood that the long-term potential for job creation 
throughout the project’s operational life time (from wind and solar PV plants at least) is limited. 
Rather, the greatest opportunity for job creation occurs during construction, which usually lasts 
up to two years. Therefore, according to bank (1):  
One challenge for the government and the country is trying to utilise the project to create 
spin off benefits for the communities in the form of relating jobs that are not directly 
project related. So if catering is going to be done, can this be done locally? Can the 
cleaning of panels be done locally etc?  
While RE IPPPP has the potential to contribute to skills development and long-term 
employment in project areas where there has been a history of long-term unemployment and 
social marginalisation, not all reports indicate that this is happening. For example, technical 
advisor (2) asked:  
Why are there issues on site when foreign contractors can’t speak to local contractors and 
there are issues of equality, and no training? Where are these people going after they have 
finished on site? Are they leaving with a construction skills certificate? Or are they just 
leaving with a bit of money in their pocket?’  
Incidents of strikes and social unrest were also cited by various interviewees, which have had an 
impact on the timelines for a number of construction schedules and commercial operation. Will 
trends of labour unrest and strikes that have seriously affected production in the coal and 
platinum industry in recent years be replicated in renewable energy industry? 
There are examples of apparently progressive attempts to mitigate this by regular 
communication with the communities via the establishment of a community liaison office, for 
instance as with the Cookhouse wind farm (Wlokas 2014). Some other developers, however, 
admitted that they were at a loss as to the best way to manage the community aspects of their 
project. Project developer (3) stated: ‘I don’t think there is enough thought given to how 
community development should be applied. It’s really done as an afterthought to try to be able 
to meet the process.’ In short, according to wind industry (1), ‘some developers really 
understand and some don’t’. The risk is serious and responses are starting to be institutionalised. 
For this reason, the South African Wind Energy Association established in 2014 the working 
group ‘Communities for wind’ to support private sector learning and positive relationship 
building with communities (see: www.sawea.org.za). The Photovoltaic Association, SAPVIA, 
followed in early 2015 with the launched of a sub-committee on the issue of SED and ED. 
6.4 Local content: a ‘proudly South African’ industry? 12 
As Table 7 illustrates, local content requirements have increased with each round of RE IPPPP, 
with thresholds for solar PV being the highest in the first two rounds. In round 1 the RE IPPPP 
criteria defined local content as ‘the total costs attributed to the project at the commercial 
operation date, excluding finance charges, land and mobilisation fees of the operations 
contractor’ (DoE 2011a:8). As local content is defined as a percentage of project expenditure 
spent in South Africa based on rand value, its accurate measurement is problematic given the 
significant fluctuations in exchange rates over time and hence the prices of imported products 
(Ahlfeldt 2013:xxi). Notably, there has been a significant devaluation of the rand since 2012, 
between rounds 1 and 3 and beyond. The global surplus in manufacturing which has contributed 
to decreasing costs in renewable energy technologies globally, particularly solar PV and wind is 
another influencing factor. It is often argued that in the short term, local content requirements 
                                                    
12  This term is inspired by a ‘buy local’ campaign launched in 2001 by government, organised business, organised labour and 
community organisations to boost job creation and pride in South African companies and national products and services. See: 
http://www.proudlysa.co.za/Index.aspx 
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inflate power costs by driving up the costs of manufacturing and hence electricity retail prices 
(ICTSID 2013:7). 
Table 7: local content targets as percentage of overall project spend 
Source: Adapted from DoE (2011a)  
Technology Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 
Wind 25% 45% 65% 
Solar PV 29% 48% 65% 
Solar CSP (without storage) 50% 60% 65% 
Solar CSP (with storage) 45% 60% 65% 
 
Local content requirements illustrate key tensions between the realisation of government 
priorities for employment generation, skills development, increased local manufacturing and the 
green economy on the one hand, and the demands by financial institutions for ‘proven 
technologies’ and project ‘bankability’ on the other. Because of lenders’ aversion to risk and 
their requirements for suppliers with international reputations, local content thresholds increase 
the risk profile of a project. In turn, smaller national players have been precluded from 
participating in RE IPPPP as technology and energy service providers (Rennkamp & Westin 
2013:18) A further constraint to the participation of local companies is the requirement that 
technologies be certified by the International Electrotechnical Commission (wind industry 2). 
However, the dependence on international suppliers thus far has meant that a major share of 
capital expenditure and publicly funded investments are leaving the country by way of 
purchasing technology hardware from abroad (Moldvay et al 2013:4-9).  
Given that South Africa does not have a well-established industry for the manufacture of 
renewable energy equipment (Ahlfeldt 2013:xiv), in global terms it is behind the curve in what 
is already a relatively mature and consolidated global industry (Lewis & Wiser 2007). For this 
reason, Eberhard (2013:6) asks whether setting up local manufacturing capability is 
competitive, and what the parts of the value chain are that maximise local employment.13 The 
increased costs associated with the use of locally assembled or manufactured hardware have, 
however, helped to meet local content thresholds given their measurement in project spend. A 
number of manufacturing and/or assembly plants are now under development or recently 
opened, including two wind tower plants, an inverter factory and four solar PV module or panel 
plants in order to meet the local content thresholds for round 3 and beyond (see Rennkamp & 
Westin 2013). However, the extent to which they will they result in technological diffusion, 
innovation and skills development in South Africa is as yet unclear. 
A number of interviewees from industry concurred that, in terms of meeting local content 
requirements, it is possible to game the system if you are ‘creative’, in part because the 
Department of Trade and Industry’s rules and definitions of how local content should be defined 
still lack clarity. Project developer (3) stated that ‘the RE IPPPP requires high local content 
which quite honestly foreign investors have to manipulate to be able to achieve’, adding that 
‘the RE IPPPP process has got built in contradictions that make it difficult and the policing of 
local content where it could be possible is inadequate’.  
It was further felt that in rounds 1 and 2 EPCs could have used more local products and services 
than they did in practice, but as foreign companies they lacked the relevant knowledge to 
procure nationally available supplies and so ended up importing them unnecessarily. Similarly, 
large international technology supply companies are often bound by their own internal 
guarantees and therefore obliged to draw on their own personnel and materials from abroad 
rather than sourcing locally. A final issue is how South Africa’s local content requirements align 
                                                    
13  A question that goes beyond the remit of this research but which has been considered by many including GIZ (2013) , 
Ahlfeldt (2013), EY (2013), Szewczuk et al (2010). 
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or conflict with international trade rules and agreements (see Rennkamp and Westin 2013), and 
whether this is a battle yet to be fought?  
7. Conclusion 
This paper has examined the case of RE IPPPP as a ground breaking development for the 
introduction of privately generated renewable energy within an electricity industry structure that 
has to date been dominated by a coal-fired monopoly utility. The programme, which, as we 
have discussed, has potentially transformative social, economic and technological impacts, has 
brought a diversity of new players and sources of investment to the country. Subsequently, a 
complex interaction of national and international stakeholders has formed within the country’s 
complex political economy. At the national level, early entrants to the sector are now bound up 
in international networks of project developers, construction companies, technology providers 
and flows of national and international finance and investment. In reflection of such trends, the 
renewable energy sector in South Africa is witnessing companies from the emerging markets of 
India and China competing and gaining market share alongside the more established European 
companies.  
A key finding relates to the way in which RE IPPPP is evolving and may continue to do so, 
particularly in light of the significant changes that have taken place between the first two rounds 
and round 3, and the delays experienced since. This has raised various concerns: over the ability 
of national players in the industry including banks to retain a stake in it; that the ownership of 
the market will become dominated by international companies; that the design of the 
programme has meant that smaller, local firms have struggled to enter and then retain a share in 
the market; and whether Eskom’s lack of financial and technical capacity to strengthen the grid 
will create obstructions for the programme. Despite attempts by the South African government 
to create an industry with national interests at its heart, the increased competition by round 3 has 
seen smaller, national players priced out of the market and unable to compete with foreign 
companies. With this in mind, it has been suggested that South Africa’s renewable energy sector 
will trend towards a market consolidation with a small number of large developers holding a 
significant market share. Exactly how this will develop in future rounds and beyond RE IPPPP 
is yet to be determined and will become evident as equity shares start to be sold on. It further 
raises the question as to whether renewable energy will end up replicating the trends evident in 
the country’s coal mining industry in which five conglomerates control 80 per cent of 
production (Eberhard 2011), or indeed the highly concentrated nature of ownership in the South 
African economy more generally, including its monopoly electricity sector (Fine & Rustomjee 
1996).  
Furthermore, with a reduced role for national banks, the dominance of foreign technology 
companies, and the sale of debt and equity concerns have been raised over the extraction of 
capital from the country, as has been witnessed in other parts of the economy (Ashman et al 
2011). This invokes Mazzucato’s (2013:161) point that such short-term interests mean that 
developers are not interested in, or able to sustain, the risks of technological development in the 
long term. Government is providing long-term support in the form of RE IPPPP but what is the 
longevity and quality of the finance and investment that this support facilitates? To what extent 
is this finance ‘long-term, patient and committed’ (Mazzucato 2013), and is there a risk that it 
may become speculative? These are questions for further research and consideration. While 
some have welcomed the emergence of a secondary market in renewable energy in South 
Africa, including the issuing of green bonds, it must also be asked whether the investment and 
finance in question will socialise the rewards as well as the risks during the long term 
(Mazzucato). A further consideration with regards to how project finance may develop may also 
be influenced by the Basel III rules for bank regulation introduced by the Bank for International 
Settlements, which will make it a lot more expensive for banks to lend long-tenure loans of up 
to 20 years (Narbel 2013). 
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The integration of RE IPPPP’s potentially progressive economic development and community 
ownership criteria is fundamental to the success of the country’s new renewable industry. 
Projects have to perform not only in a challenging technical environment but also bring about 
meaningful economic development and create jobs. But will it be possible for developers to 
overcome their competitive nature and find ways to collaborate with each other as well as 
engage in honest and open communication with the local population and the labour force in 
order to achieve this? This brings us to the tension inherent in the nature of project finance 
between demands for project ‘bankability’, including proven technologies and expertise, and the 
critical requirements for economic development and community ownership in a country with 
high unemployment and gross inequality along racial divisions. How these tensions are 
managed over the long term is fundamental to the success of the industry and the extent to 
which it will result in long-term and sustainable benefits beyond the generation of renewable 
electricity. This raises questions over what the role of the state should be in regulating the 
programme and managing these tensions in order to uphold and protect the socio-economic co-
benefits of energy investments. Such considerations go to the heart of how ‘low-carbon 
development’ should be defined (Mulugetta & Urban 2010), and to what a ‘just’, low-carbon 
transition (Swilling & Annecke 2012) could mean in practice.  
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